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Abstract 
Many economic interactions are characterized by “all-or-nothing” action spaces that may limit the 
demonstrability of intended trust. We investigate whether restricting investment opportunities to 
all-or-nothing options affects the investment rate and propensity to reciprocate. We do this by 
manipulating the investor’s action space in two versions of the trust game. In the all-or-nothing 
game the investor can invest either $10 (all) or $0 (nothing), while in the continuous game the 
investor can invest any amount between $10 and $0. In both games, the trustee receives the tripled 
investment and then can return any amount to the investor. Results indicate that investments are 
higher in the all-or-nothing game than in the continuous game. However, higher investments in 
the all-or-nothing game do not lead to higher returns. To the contrary, conditional on $10 
investments, on average trustees return less in the all-or-nothing game. Although the all-or-
nothing action space results in greater wealth overall, it also appears to “backfire” for investors 
who do not benefit from the increased wealth. These results support the proposition that humans 
perceive intentions not only by evaluating what others do but also by evaluating what others choose 
not to do. 
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1. Introduction 
Trust and trustworthiness are fundamental to an efficient economy, where (i) trust is 
demonstrated by willfully ceding resources or control to another, making them vulnerable, with 
the expectation that the other intends to reciprocate and not be opportunistic, and (ii) 
trustworthiness is demonstrated by not succumbing to opportunism so as to reciprocate the 
resources or control that another has vested with trust. Interactions that require trust involve a basic 
dilemma where self-interest and safety are traded off with the potential benefits that arise from a 
trust-based reciprocity relationship. 
Prior research on trust games shows that trust generates trustworthiness: the more an 
investor voluntarily invests from his endowment, the more likely the trustee is to reciprocate by 
voluntarily returning discretionary income generated by the investment (e.g., Reuben et al., 2009). 
Ostrom and Walker (2003) review continuous trust games, modeled after Berg et al. (1995) and 
find that larger amounts tend to generate positive returns on investment. Fehr et al. (1996) and 
Falk and Gächter (2002) find similar results in gift exchange games. An important implication of 
these findings is that investors engaged in a trust-base exchange relationship can maximize their 
expected returns by increasing their investments to sufficiently high levels. 
Two questions motivate our study. First, can we generate more investment by restricting 
the investor’s choice set to an all-or-nothing (either investing or keeping their entire endowment) 
option? Second, if we can generate higher investment using all-or-nothing restrictions, will that 
higher investment also lead to higher reciprocity? Results addressing these questions are of interest 
to managers, social and financial planners, and behavioral economists for a couple of reasons. 
First, economic institutions often restrict individual decisions, making it important to know 
whether such restrictions are efficient. The increasingly popular practice of intentionally 
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manipulating people’s “choice architecture” (Münscher et al., 2015) has led to documented 
economic improvements for both investors and trustees, making it of great interest to social and 
financial planners (Thaler and Sunstein, 2012). Second, many behavioral economists use and refer 
to results of “trust games” with highly restricted action spaces (e.g., only two or three options), 
considering these equivalent to “trust games” with more continuous action spaces. An improved 
understanding of how trust game environments affect trust and reciprocity should be of great 
importance to many, given the explosion in literature making the “trust game” a very popular topic 
of study (for reviews see Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Balliet and Van Lange, 2013).  
While restriction of investment and contribution options is a strategy pursued by 
entrepreneurs generating venture capital and by fundraisers soliciting donations, it is unclear 
whether restrictive choice designs reliably raise net transfers in the laboratory.2 In the context of a 
threshold public goods game, for example, Cadsby and Maynes (1999) find lower levels of 
contribution when participants are provided binary rather than continuous action spaces. On the 
other hand, in the context of linear public goods games Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) do 
not find differences in levels of contribution using binary (i.e., 0 or 10) versus integer (i.e., 0, 1, 
…, 10) action spaces. Given these conflicting findings it is not clear how restricting investment 
options would impact investments in a trust game. 
Whether more restricted investment options affect reciprocity is a second important 
question motivating this research. Although the implicit hypothesis is well founded and compelling 
(i.e., if investments are raised, positive returns will increase), a few studies suggest that the 
																																																								
2 A minimum investment (e.g., $25,000) is typically required for an angel investor to be able to invest in a company 
(Sudek, 2006). Minimum “pledges” are also common requirements to support projects on www.kickstarter.com, the 
world's largest funding platform. Experimental studies using appeals scales (a form of choice architecture 
manipulation), demonstrate that fundraisers can increase net donations by suggesting discrete contribution levels 
(Doob and McLaughlin, 1989; Schibrowsky and Peltier, 1995; Desmet and Feinberg, 2003). 
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relationship between investment rate and reciprocity may not be so straightforward: if investment 
does not provide much information about intentions of the investor, trustees may not reciprocate 
(e.g., Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 1998; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Bacharach 
et al., 2007). We suggest that the granularity of the investor’s action space affects demonstration 
of intended trust in its ability to reveal that the investor has forgone available alternatives to secure 
some portion of their endowment and avoid the downside risk otherwise associated with 
investment. Investment demonstrated in an environment of more (fewer) alternatives provides the 
trustee a clearer (more ambiguous) indication of intended trust.  
To better understand how restriction of investor action space affects investments and 
returns, we examine behavior in two versions of the trust game inspired by the original Berg et al. 
(1995) “investment game” and the Bolle (1998) “rewarding trust game”. In both versions, the 
investor receives a $10 endowment and then makes an investment decision. In the continuous 
version, the investor can invest nothing or any amount (in increments of $0.01) of the $10 
endowment, while in the all-or-nothing version the investor can invest either $0 or $10.3 In both 
versions, the un-endowed trustee receives the tripled amount of the investment and then can return 
any amount back to the investor.4 This design allows us to compare equally unrestricted trustee 
reciprocity between versions. We find that investments are higher in the all-or-nothing game than 
in the continuous game ($7.71 versus $5.50). However, when investment is limited to a two-choice 
option, as in the all-or-nothing game, reciprocity decreases. On average trustees who receive $30 
income (from $10 investment) return less in the all-or-nothing game than in the continuous game 
($10.03 versus $12.71). These results suggest that investor action space restriction affects trustee 
																																																								
3 Our continuous game is quasi-continuous: investors could select an amount to the penny exactly. As such, they had 
1,001 options available in the range $0-$10. 
4  In Berg et al. (1995) the trustee was symmetrically endowed with $10. Other research has used asymmetric 
endowments in the trust game (Glaeser et al., 2000; Xiao and Bicchieri, 2010; Reitz et al., 2014.).  
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reciprocation: although trustees use investment amounts to index intended trust and reciprocate 
based on this, by restricting the investor’s alternatives to an all-or-nothing action space – we restrict 
his ability to clearly demonstrate intended trust. Our results support the proposition that humans 
perceive intentions not only by evaluating what others do but also by evaluating what others 
choose not to do.  
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University's Economic Science Institute (ESI). 
A total of 248 participants were recruited from a participant pool consisting primarily of 
undergraduate students and randomly assigned to a single session. There were seven sessions of 
the continuous treatment (N = 152) and four of the all-or-nothing treatment (N = 96). Those who 
had participated in trust-based experiments at ESI were excluded. Participants were seated at 
visually isolated workstations and interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer 
network. The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Each of eleven sessions consisted of 18 to 24 participants, lasted approximately 35 minutes, 
and was sequenced as follows. First, an experimenter read the instructions aloud while each 
participant followed along with their own copy of the instructions. The instructions explained the 
experimental procedures and payoffs used in the experiment (see Appendix). After finishing the 
instructions, participants were given five minutes to write down their answers to several questions 
to ensure that they understood the instructions (see Appendix). Participants' answers remained 
confidential. After participants completed the quiz, the experimenter distributed a printed copy of 
the correct quiz answers. The experimenter privately answered any questions regarding the 
experimental procedures. 
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The computer randomly assigned participants into pairs and each participant within a pair 
was randomly assigned a role, labeled person 1 for the investor and person 2 for the trustee. Each 
participant was paid $7 for participation and the payoffs from the trust game after signing a receipt. 
On average subjects earned $9.75 in addition to their participation payment. 
3. Predictions 
There are several differences that we might expect when comparing behavior in the 
continuous treatment and the all-or-nothing treatment. First, we expect to see differences in 
investors’ behavior. Substantial heterogeneity in investments is well documented in trust games 
with continuous action space (e.g., Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). Most 
investors choose to invest something between $0 and $10, with a minority investing $0 or the full 
endowment of $10 (Ostrom and Walker, 2003).  
In the original Berg et al., (1995) trust game, investment was uniform over the 11 choices 
($0, $1, $2, …, $10). When the action space for investments is reduced to all-or-nothing options, 
we might reasonably expect investors who would have made a relatively low investment in the 
continuous treatment to invest $0 in the all-or-nothing treatment, while investors who would have 
made a relatively high investment in the continuous treatment to invest $10 in the all-or-nothing 
treatment. If the remaining investors also round up or down accordingly, then total investment 
should be equal across treatments, similar to contributions levels in Gangadharan and Nikiforakis’ 
(2009) public goods game. Alternatively, investors might round down, similar to contributions in 
Cadsby and Maynes’ (1999) threshold public goods game. However, we predict investment will 
increase, similar to Eckel and Wilson (2004), who find that in the context of binary trust games 80 
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percent of investors send the full amount. 5  This prediction is based on List’s (2007) work 
examining action space changes in the dictator game, where participants tend to avoid the most 
selfish choice available, which in the all-or-nothing treatment, is to transfer nothing.6  
Prediction 1: Investment in the all-or-nothing treatment is higher than in the continuous 
treatment. 
We also expect to see differences in trustees’ behavior. It is well documented in 
experimental research that when trusted, trustees act as if motivated by reciprocity (Berg et al., 
1995; Fehr et al., 1996; Falk and Gächter, 2002). Models of reciprocity include outcome-based 
models and intention-based models. Outcome-based models focus on distribution concerns such 
as inequality, efficiency, and fairness. Agents in such models are assumed to care not only about 
their own payoff but also about other agents’ payoffs (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfelds, 2000). The intention-based models focus on concerns such as kindness, guilt, and 
reputation. Agents in such models who are assumed to care about non-monetary hedonic 
experience (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) and 
perceived intentions (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Segal and Sobel, 1999; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 
2004), will repay investors’ perceived kindness (i.e., intended trust in our settings) with higher 
reciprocity. Reciprocal behavior can often be consistent with both outcome-based and intention-
based models of reciprocity. Although both types of models have found significant support in the 
																																																								
5 Since Eckel and Wilson (2004) both (i) restrict the investor and trustee action space and (ii) frame the amount sent 
by the investor as a “loan” – the reason for increased investment is unclear. 
6 Camerer (2003, 57, table 2.4) reports that across dictator games, where the participants can send some portion of 
endowments to another, approximately 40% send zero. List (2007) examines a game where the action space increases, 
the dictator can take from in addition to giving to another, and find a comparable percentage of participants choose 
the most selfish option. 
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literature (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk et al., 2008), intention-based models better explain 
behavior in trust games (e.g., Nelson, 2002; McCabe et al., 2003; Cox et al., 2008). 7  
Given that the demonstration of intention matters, we might expect trustees in the 
continuous treatment to behave differently than in the all-or-nothing treatment. Investors who 
invest $10 in the continuous treatment demonstrate the highest level of intended trust, because they 
could have invested less (say $7 or $8) but chose to go “all-in” ($10). While the demonstration of 
intended trust is likely to be reciprocated with a high return (Fehr et al., 1996; Falk and Gächter, 
2002; Ostrom and Walker, 2003), investors who invest all $10 in the all-or-nothing treatment 
cannot clearly demonstrate that they intended to have the highest level of trust in the trustee, 
because their only alternative is to invest nothing.8 As such, the amount invested in the all-or-
nothing treatment is a less convincing demonstration of intended trust. Consequently, conditional 
on investment of $10, we should expect lower returns in the all-or-nothing treatment than in the 
continuous treatment. 
Prediction 2: Conditional on investment of $10, the average return in the all-or-nothing 
treatment is lower than in the continuous treatment. 
																																																								
7 However, in some intention based-models the perceived kindness of an action is measured by comparing the 
perceiver’s payoff against a benchmark. This benchmark is a convex combination of the highest and lowest payoff 
alternative actions that could have transpired (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). In our 
experimental setting, the highest and lowest payoffs to the trustee occur when the investor invests everything or 
nothing, respectively. As such, these particular models cannot distinguish between the perceptions of kindness 
between treatments when the investor invests everything. 
8 Falk et al. (2003) find that in ultimatum games the rejection rate by the second mover of a proposed distribution 
(80/20) differs depending upon the alternative(s) the first mover had (i.e., a single 20/80 alternative versus both 20/80 
and 50/50 alternatives). The authors claim that the intention behind the proposal is assessed in light of the options 
foregone, as the second mover was more likely to reject the 80/20 split when the proposer could have offered an equal 
division. Nelson (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002) report similar results. 
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4. Results 
No significant differences were found between sessions of a given treatment (seven for the 
continuous treatment and four for the all-or-nothing treatment), so we report the combined results. 
Figure 1 displays a bubble plot of the amount sent and returned in both treatments. There is 
substantial variability in individual behavior. On average, investors in the continuous treatment 
invest $5.50 (SE = 0.43, N = 76) and trustees return $5.86 (SE = 0.67), resulting in earnings of 
$10.35 (SE = 0.36) and $10.65 (SE = 0.76), respectively. Return on investment (ROI) is -0.12 
(Mdn = 0.00, SE = 0.07, N=64).9 These results are consistent with previous findings of Berg et al. 
(1995). In the all-or-nothing treatment, on average investors invest $7.71 (SE = 0.61, N = 48) and 
trustees return $7.73 (SE = 0.95), resulting in average earnings of $10.02 (SE = 0.73) for the 
investors and $15.40 (SE = 1.42), for the trustees. ROI is 0.00 (Mdn = 0.00, SE = 0.09, N=37). 
Because investments, earnings and ROI in the two treatments have different variances, we 
use the two-sample robust rank-order test for difference between treatments. The robust rank order 
test is an alternative to the Mann-Whitney-Wilcox test for non-normal samples with unequal 
variances that does not assume equal variances, equal shape, or normality (Feltovich, 2003). 
Result 1: In the continuous treatment return on investment (ROI) is increasing in the 
amount invested. 
Figure 1 illustrates that in the continuous treatment investments of $6 or less generate 
average returns smaller than the investment, yielding negative ROI (M = -0.527, SEM = 0.083). 
However, investments larger than $6 on average generate positive ROI (M = 0.2014, SEM = 
0.069). A simple OLS regression, where the independent variable is the investment and the 
dependent variable is ROI, confirms that the relationship is significant (β = 0.71, t(62) = 7.91, p < 
																																																								
9 ROI is defined as return minus investment divided by investment, and is not defined when investment is zero. 
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0.01, N = 64, F(1,62) = 62.50, Adj. R2 = 0.494). A quadratic OLS regression, where the dependent 
variable is the return and the independent variable is investment, results in better fit (N = 76, 
F(2,73) = 154.19, Adj. R2 = 0.809, Bayesian information criterion (BIC) = 369.58) than a linear 
model of investment (N = 76, F(1,74) = 243.00, Adj. R2 = 0.767, BIC = 380.32). The increase in 
Adj. R2 is significant (F(1,73) = 16.03, p < 0.001). This quadratic regression is illustrated in Figure 
1. 
Result 2: Investment in the all-or-nothing treatment is higher than in the continuous 
treatment. 
Consistent with Prediction 1, investment is higher in the all-or-nothing treatment (Mdn = 
$10.0, SE = 0.61) than in the continuous treatment (Mdn = $5.5, SE = 0.43) based on the robust 
rank-order test (U = 3.236, p < 0.001). In the continuous treatment fewer investors (58%) invest 
$5 or more, compared to the all-or-nothing treatment (77%), a significant difference according to 
Fischer’s exact test (p = 0.034, N1 = 48, N2 = 76). Finally, there is very little difference in the 
proportion of $0 investments between the all-or-nothing treatment and the continuous treatment 
(23% versus 16%). Fisher's exact test indicates the difference is not significant (p = 0.349, N1 = 
48, N2 = 76).  
Despite the increase in investment, investor's earnings in the all-or-nothing treatment (Mdn 
= $10.0, SE = 0.73) and the continuous treatment (Mdn = $10.0, SE = 0.36) do not differ (U = 
0.782, p = 0.217). The increase in wealth created by increased investment is captured by trustees 
who earn more (U = 3.425, p < 0.001) in the all-or-nothing treatment (Mdn = $15.0, SE = 1.42) 
than trustees in the continuous treatment (Mdn = $12.62, SE = 0.76). 
Result 3: Conditional on investment of $10, the average ROI is lower in the all-or-nothing 
treatment than in the continuous treatment. 
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Consistent with Prediction 2, conditional on investment of $10, the average ROI in the all-
or-nothing treatment is 0.00 (SE = 0.09, N = 37), which is lower than the ROI of 0.27 (SE = 0.08, 
N = 21) in the continuous treatment (U = 1.611, p = 0.053). Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of 
returns conditional on investment of $10 by treatment. In the all-or-nothing treatment, 19% of 
trustees return $0, 8% of trustees return less than $10, 24% return exactly $10, and 49% return 
more than $10. In contrast, in the continuous treatment only 5% of trustees return $0, 24% return 
exactly $10, and 71% return more than $10. The proportion of $10 investments earning a ROI 
greater than zero is lower in the all-or-nothing treatment (73%) than in the continuous treatment 
(95%) based on Fisher's exact test (p = 0.036, N1 = 37, N2 = 21). 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The original study of Berg et al. (1995) documented that trustees tend to return an amount 
greater than invested to those who invest more than $5, but return less than the amount invested to 
those who do not. Others, including Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009), Johnson and Mislin (2011), 
and Rietz et al. (2015), report observing this pattern. In the continuous treatment there is a positive 
relationship between the amount invested and the ROI. This is consistent with our conjecture that 
maximal investment in the continuous treatment serves as less ambiguous indication of maximal 
trust (encouraging trustee reciprocation) while maximal investment in the all-or-nothing treatment 
is more ambiguous. Accordingly, our findings show that returns on maximal investments in the 
all-or-nothing treatment are lower than in the continuous treatment. 
If reciprocity was purely motivated by distributional concerns (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfelds, 2000), we would expect trustees to return some amount regardless of 
perceptions of investor trust intention. Accordingly we would expect equivalent reciprocity 
between treatments – but this is clearly not what is observed. However, the logic behind intention-
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based theories of reciprocity, that perceived kindness (i.e. trust) is repaid with kindness (i.e. a 
profitable return), is consistent with our results.  
Our results might also be explained by reciprocity concerns informed with treatment 
specific reference points. If experimental games effectively invoke extra-laboratory “real world” 
problems for participants, even experimentally naïve participants aware of local norms could form 
reasonable expectations about others’ game behaviors. A number of experiments have documented 
that participants on average have correct expectations about the behavior of others (e.g., Guerra 
and Zizzo, 2004; Casari and Cason, 2009; Bellemare et al., 2010; Sheremeta and Shields, 2013). 
Conditional on “correct expectations”, a trustee who received an investment of $10 in the 
continuous treatment may have considered it a relatively large investment compared to a prior, 
perhaps one close to the average investment of $5.50 observed in our continuous treatment. It may 
be that trustees reciprocated relatively large investments with greater returns because they 
considered those investments indicative of high trust. Likewise, trustees who received $10 in the 
all-or-nothing treatment may not have been as impressed, considering it not to necessarily be 
indicative of high trust, and so reciprocated relatively less. However, we want to note that an 
important aspect of our data does not support this correct expectations hypothesis. When 
examining investments greater than $7 in the continuous treatment (i.e., a similar difference from 
the average as between maximal and average investments in the all-or-nothing treatment), the ROI 
is still greater (Mdn = 0.40) than from $10 investments in the all-or-nothing treatment (Mdn = 
0.00) based on the two-sample robust rank-order test (U = 1.626, p = 0.052). Our results are 
consistent with an alternative reference point perspective informed by Kimbrough and 
Vostroknutov’s (2015) model of norm-dependent utility. Their model suggests that normative 
behavior will change depending upon features of treatment environments. For example, people 
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may be expected to ‘invest all’ in the all-or-nothing case, but ‘invest something’ in the continuous 
case. Indeed, our results are consistent with this hypothesis. 
In summary, our study provides clear support for the hypothesis that when coarse-grained 
action spaces, such as all-or-nothing investment options, are introduced, people are more likely to 
invest everything – increasing average investment. As a result of this increased investment, those 
who would have invested less given the opportunity are now among the greater pool of “all-in” 
investors. While amounts invested appear to demonstrate differential levels trust, the all-or-nothing 
action space obfuscates demonstrable trust, making the all-in investor’s intention more ambiguous. 
Although the all-or-nothing action space does produce a higher average investment, resulting in 
greater welfare, it also appears to “backfire” for investors who do not share in the increased wealth. 
Most studies measuring trust employ variants of either the continuous version of the trust 
game of Berg et al. (1995) or the binary version of the trust game of Güth et al. (1997). There are 
many early examples of often-cited studies (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Dasgupta, 1988; Kreps, 
1990), as well as more recent studies (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002; Schniter et al., 2013), 
referring to games with binary choices as “trust games”. While the aforementioned research 
furthers understanding of trust and reciprocity, our results demonstrating disparate behavior 
between different trust games suggest caution should be taken when extending results from one 
game to the other. Furthermore, while the fundamental determinants motivating trust and 
reciprocity in binary trust games should correspond to determinants of trust and reciprocity 
observed in continuous games, the degree to which these determinants actually motivate trust and 
reciprocity should depend on the granularity of the action space useful for signaling the calibration 
of internal motivations. 
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Finally, we conclude by noting hat, while the procedure better suited for eliciting the 
relationship between trust and reciprocity is often called the “investment game”, the procedure that 
does not appear as well suited is usually called the “trust game”.10 Although binary or limited 
option “trust games” may be more appealing to implement due to the convenience of procedural 
simplification and enhanced statistical power, we suggest that variants of the Berg et al. (1995) 
continuous “investment game” are better suited for investigating the relationship between 
demonstrable trust and trustworthiness. 
 
  
																																																								
10 Though useful, the convention of referring to the continuous game as the “investment game” and the binary game 
as the “trust game” is not widely adopted. For example, Johnson and Mislin (2011) report the results from 162 
replications of Berg et al. (1995) in a meta-analysis, labeling the replications “trust games” and excluding games 
where the participants made binary choices. 
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Figure 1: Bubble Plots of Investment and Return by Treatment 
 
 
 
Note: Observations are plotted with bubbles, where the relative size indicates the proportion of 
observations in the treatment. The smallest bubble plotted represents approximately 1.5 percent 
and the largest bubble plotted approximately 33 percent. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Returns Conditional on Investment of $10 by Treatment 
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Appendix – Instructions for the Continuous (All-or-nothing) Treatment 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The currency used in the experiment is experimental dollars, and 
they will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 1 experimental dollar to 1 dollar. At the end of 
the experiment your earnings will be paid to you in private and in cash. It is very important that 
you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need 
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc… you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect, and 
appreciate, you adhering to these policies. 
The participants in today's experiment will be randomly assigned into two-person groups. 
In addition to the group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific 
type in the group, designated as Person 1 or Person 2. You and the other participant in your group 
will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment consists of two decision 
stages. 
In stage 1, Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person 2. 
Person 1 can send none, more than none, or all of the $10 to Person 2. […For the all-or-nothing 
game, this sentence read “Person 1 receives $10 and then decides whether to send either $0 or $10 
to Person 2”…]. The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before reaching Person 2. In stage 2, Person 
2 decides how many of the dollars they received to send back to Person 1. Person 2 can send back 
none, more than none, or all of the amount received back to Person 1. At that point the experiment 
is over. Next we describe in details the decisions made by both persons in each stage of the 
experiment. 
Stage 1: Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person 2. 
Person 1 can send none, more than none, or all of the $10. […For the all-or-nothing game, this 
sentence read “Person 1 receives $10 and then decides whether to send either $0 or $10 to Person 
2”…]. Person 1 enters the amount sent to Person 2 in the box labeled “The amount sent by Person 
1” below [Figure A1 was shown after this paragraph]. Person 1 keeps any amount that is not sent 
to Person 2. The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before reaching Person 2. 
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Stage 2: After learning the amount sent by Person 1, Person 2 decides how many dollars 
to send back to Person 1. Person 2 can send back none, more than none, or all of the amount in 
Person 2's account at that time. Person 2 enters the amount sent back to Person 1 in the box labeled 
“The amount sent back by Person 2” below [Figure A2 was shown after this paragraph]. The 
amount sent back by Person 2 is NOT multiplied. Person 2 keeps any amount that is not sent back 
to Person 1. 
 
Finally, at the end of the Stage 2 the total earnings are reported to each person. Person 1's 
earnings will equal $10 less the amount sent to Person 2 plus the amount sent back by Person 2. 
Person 2's earning will equal three times the amount sent by Person 1 less the amount sent back to 
Person 1. Please record the decisions and your earnings on your record sheet under the appropriate 
heading. 
 
SUMMARY 
The computer will assign you and one other participant to a two-person group, consisting 
of Person 1 and Person 2. In stage 1, Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to 
send to Person 2. […For the all-or-nothing game, this sentence read “Person 1 receives $10 and 
then decides whether to send either $0 or $10 to Person 2”…]. Person 1 can send none, more than 
none, or all of the $10. The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled. In stage 2, Person 2 decides how 
many dollars to send back to Person 1. Person 2 can send back none, more than none, or all of the 
amount in Person 2's account at that time. At the end of Stage 2 the total earnings are reported to 
each person. This experiment is now over and your earnings will be part of the total you will be 
paid. 
 
QUIZ 
Before starting, we want you to answer some questions regarding the experiment to be sure 
you understand what will follow. After five minutes an experimenter will return to privately review 
your answers. Afterwards you will participate in the experiment only one time. 
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1. True or false: the amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before reaching Person 2’s account. 
2. True or false: the amount sent back by Person 2 is tripled before reaching Person 1’s 
account. 
3. What is the largest amount Person 1 can send to Person 2? 
4. What is the smallest amount Person 1 can send to Person 2? 
5. If Person 1 sent $4.20 to Person 2, what is largest amount Person 2 can send back to Person 
1? 
6. If Person 1 sent $9.00 to Person 2, what is smallest amount Person 2 can send back to 
Person 1? 
7. True or false: If Person 1 sends something to Person 2, then Person 2 has to send 
something back to Person 1. 
8. True or false: you will participate in this experiment only one time. 
 
For the all-or-nothing game, questions 3 through 7 were: 
3. What are the only two possible amounts Person 1 can send to Person 2? 
4. If Person 1 sent $0 to Person 2, what is the smallest amount Person 2 can send back to 
Person 1? 
5. If Person 1 sent $10 to Person 2, what is the smallest amount Person 2 can send back to 
Person 1? 
6. If Person 1 sent $10 to Person 2, what is the largest amount Person 2 can send back to 
Person 1? 
7. True or false: If Person 1 sends $10 to Person 2, then Person 2 has to send something back to Person 
1. 
 
